Zone Reg Smart operations over brute force. Engineering since 2002, domains and DNS since 2005

Smart Registrar

Theme. Make every name we issue signed from its first minute, by owning the one link nobody owns: the DS record at the parent.

The name is free; the condition is DNSSEC. Every name is checked every hour, however it is signed. This board is the design, before any code: panels 6 to 10 are marked planned until there is something to measure.

Plan
1
Theme, 5W2H

The chain breaks at the parent

A zone can be signed perfectly and still be unprotected: validation needs a matching DS at the parent, and putting it there is a manual step between two companies.

What
signed zones with no DS at the parent
Where
between the signer and the registrar
When
at signing, key changes, host moves
Why
a broken chain lets forgeries through
How
own the parent link; signing is the condition
2
Current situation

Validation is common; signed delegations are rare

A third of users would reject a forged answer, but only a few names give them a chain to check. The missing piece is the DS at the parent.

  • About 36% of users validate; about 7% of delegations are secure (2025)
  • Under 1 in 10 registrars put a DS on their own domain (June 2025)
  • Over 30% of attempts broken by a missing DS; about 40% never finish the step
  • The automatic route (CDS) needs ICANN approval for generic TLDs
  • Free names have a history: phishing fell when the largest free registry stopped
3
Target

Signed from the first minute

Each target removes a step that today depends on someone remembering. Progress against them is measured in panel 8 from the first name.

  • Every active name has a secure delegation, or it is not active
  • No manual step at the parent for names Steward signs
  • A broken chain noticed within the hour, by us
  • An abuse listing acted on within the hour
  • If we stop, a registrant loses nothing they own
4
Strategy and plan

The name is free; the condition is DNSSEC

Names under a domain we already hold are given away, licensed for as long as they stay signed. Any way of signing counts.

  1. Free, conditional on DNSSEC; eng.quest first
  2. Sign it anywhere: your own DNS, or DNSSEC Steward
  3. One check for every name, every hour
  4. We register only our own free names
  5. Your own domain stays yours, at your registrar
  6. Steward signing is the only thing ever charged for
5
Root cause

The parent link has no owner

Nobody is paid, or obliged, to finish the job. The registry makes it its own: it is the parent, it checks hourly, and the name depends on it.

  • Registries that paid registrars saw DS uploaded by default (.nl, .se)
  • A premium fee for DNSSEC kept adoption very low; free opt-in raised it
  • No one checks the chain continuously and acts on it
Do, check, act
6
Countermeasure, planned

The registry owns the link, and nothing else

Its own VMs at two sites, one narrow path into DNS, and Steward as one way to stay signed. It decides from public DNS only.

  • Narrow path: NS and DS for its own names, nothing else
  • Registrants edit in PowerDNS-Admin, seeing only their zones
  • One name per account until the Public Suffix List
  • Abuse lists checked hourly; a listed name is suspended for good
  • More than one parent; a second held ready
  • If we stop, Steward removes its DS first
7
Implementation, planned

Every name, every hour

One cycle for every name, whoever signs it. Failure is warned, then deactivated, and restored the moment it validates; abuse is not restored.

  • Notice, then fix-now a day later, then deactivation
  • Restored automatically once the chain validates
  • Abuse: suspended at once, never reissued
  • Built and released like Steward: small, reversible steps
  • Already in Steward: keys encrypted at rest (7.27, 7.28)
8
Results, from launch

Measured from the first name

Nothing to measure yet, so the baseline is the industry. From the first name, this panel shows our own figures, live.

  • Names active, and the share validating
  • Time from a break to the first notice
  • Names deactivated, and restored
  • Abuse suspensions and their time to action
  • Accounts per parent domain
9
Standardise

Rules before the first name

The registry starts with Steward’s lessons and adds its own. Each will be held by code, by a check, or by a release step.

  • Visible is never managed
  • Remove the DS before you stop signing
  • We register only our own free names
  • Abuse suspension is permanent
  • Third-party keys used only for NS and DS
10
Next

Gates to launch

Gates, not dates. The first public name goes live only when everything behind it has been proven.

  • Engine, hourly check and notices proven on test names
  • Abuse and sign-up checks chosen, with licence terms
  • Privacy notice and retention period
  • Registrant PowerDNS-Admin with single sign-on
  • Registry VMs at two sites, built from the image
  • Then eng.quest live, and the Public Suffix List evidence

Notes

  1. Built to: RFC 4033 to 4035, DNSSEC; RFC 6781, DNSSEC operational practice; RFC 7344 and 8078, CDS and CDNSKEY; RFC 9615, automatic bootstrapping; OpenID Connect Core 1.0, registrant sign-in.
  2. Sources: APNIC Blog (Jantzen and Thomassen, Feb 2026; Chung, Dec 2017); CircleID (Sattler, Nov 2026); Krebs on Security (Mar and May 2023). Full references on each A3 sheet.
  3. Status: design, before any code. Panels 6 to 10 are planned; panel 8 shows the industry baseline until the first name exists.
  4. Live DNSSEC check: the seal in the logo is earned in your browser: Google and Cloudflare validate zone-reg.com, the key chain is verified locally, and a broken control domain must be refused. Select the logo for the details.
  5. Select any panel for its A3 sheet. Pricing is published on the sign-up page, not here.
TitleSmart Registrar: free names that stay signed
DrawingZR-SR-001RevisionA
MethodQC story, 10 stepsSheet1 of 12
DrawnP. WilliamsonDate18 Nov 2026
OwnerZone Reg, e-businesshosting.com